土地财政背后相关利益主体的演化博弈分析

doi:10.14088/j.cnki.issn0439-8114.2021.16.037

湖北农业科学 ›› 2021, Vol. 60 ›› Issue (16): 189-194.doi: 10.14088/j.cnki.issn0439-8114.2021.16.037

土地财政背后相关利益主体的演化博弈分析

侯伟凤

首都经济贸易大学经济学院,北京 100070

收稿日期:2020-08-23 出版日期:2021-08-25 发布日期:2021-09-09
作者简介:侯伟凤（1992-）,女,山西大同人,在读博士研究生,研究方向为宏观经济与数量经济,（电话）18810685118（电子信箱）bella5118@163.com。

The evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders behind land finance

HOU Wei-feng

School of Economics,Capital University of Economics and Business,Beijing 100070,China

Received:2020-08-23 Online:2021-08-25 Published:2021-09-09

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 土地财政背后是地方政府的大量征地行为,引发了多方利益冲突。构建相关利益主体的博弈模型,识别政府部门和失地农民之间的利益关系和演化稳定策略,并进行数值仿真和相关影响因素的分析。结果表明,①中央政府监管净收益高于成本且地方政府合法征地收益较高以及失地农民得到补偿时,博弈系统的演化稳定策略为监督-合法征地-接受征地;②中央政府监管成本的上升会减弱监管策略选择的倾向;③地方政府非法征地收益的增加会减弱合法征地策略选择的倾向;④失地农民维权成本的降低会驱使失地农民选择抵制征地策略。因此,改革征地制度、加大对违法征地的惩罚、规范地方政府行为以及为农民构建畅通的维权渠道对缓解征地冲突具有重要意义。

关键词: 土地财政, 中央政府, 地方政府, 失地农民, 博弈, 数值仿真

Abstract: Behind land finance was a large number of land expropriation by local governments, which caused multi-interest conflicts. This study constructed the game model of relevant stakeholders, identified the interest relationship between government departments and land-lost farmers and the evolutionary stability strategy, and carried out numerical simulation and analysis of relevant influencing factors. The results showed that, ①when the net income of central government regulation was higher than the cost, the income of local government legal land expropriation was higher and land-lost farmers were compensated, the evolutionary stability strategy of the game system was supervision-legal land expropriation-acceptance of land expropriation; ② the rise of the central government's regulatory cost will weaken the tendency of regulatory strategy choice; ③ the increase of income from illegal land expropriation of local governments will weaken the tendency to choose legal land expropriation strategies;④the reduction of the cost of protecting the rights of land-lost farmers will drive the land-lost farmers to choose the strategy of resisting land acquisition. Therefore, it was of great significance to reform the land expropriation system, increase the punishment of illegal land expropriation, standardize the behavior of local government and construct a smooth channel for land-lost farmers to protect their rights to alleviate the land expropriation conflicts.

Key words: land finance, central government, local government, land-lost farmers, game, numerical simulation

中图分类号:

F224.32

侯伟凤. 土地财政背后相关利益主体的演化博弈分析[J]. 湖北农业科学, 2021, 60(16): 189-194.

HOU Wei-feng. The evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders behind land finance[J]. HUBEI AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES, 2021, 60(16): 189-194.

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土地财政背后相关利益主体的演化博弈分析

The evolutionary game analysis of stakeholders behind land finance

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